THE IMPACT OF AUDIT COMMITTEE SKEPTICISM AND REWARDING POWER ON AUDITOR COMMUNICATION WITH THE AUDIT COMMITTEE

Abstract

This study analyzes how audit committee skepticism and reward power affect auditor communication with the audit committee. Based on accountability theory, this study examines the prediction that high skepticism and audit committee reward power encourage auditors to convey more and more timely information. Through the literature review method of previous research, especially experimental research involving audit partners and managers, this study examines how audit committee skepticism (high/low) and reward power (high/low) affect auditor communication. The study results show that audit committee skepticism and reward power encourage auditors to communicate more information and report more timely. Further analysis reveals that audit committee skepticism has the strongest influence on auditor communication levels, while reward power affects communication timing more. These findings confirm the importance of audit committee skepticism and reward power in improving auditor communication.